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GOOGLE BOOKS AND YOUTUBE: PRESERVING FAIR USE
ON THE WORLD’S LEADING INTERNET VIDEO
COMMUNITY
1

Meghan McSkimming
I.

*

INTRODUCTION

Thousands of years after the Library of Alexandria was
destroyed, man has used technology to change the way the world
2
interacts with creative works. In the face of constantly evolving
technology, copyright law is experiencing a tumultuous upheaval. In
the past, accessing printed, audio, or visual materials required
physical possession of an object, like a book, CD, or DVD. Today, the
Internet makes information instantly accessible.
In 2004, Google—following the current trend away from a printbased market—undertook a massive and unprecedented endeavor
3
with its “Google Library Project.” Without first seeking copyright
4
holders’ permission, Google created agreements with research
libraries, scanned their print collections, and compiled a searchable
5
digital library. Google would display a few lines of text as Internet
6
search results, but not the entire book. To the average Internet user,
being able to obtain the digital versions of books is highly desirable.
*

J.D., May 2012, Seton Hall University School of Law; B.A., 2009, Fordham
University. Thank you to Professor David Opderbeck for his supervision and
guidance, and to Brigitte Radigan for her comments and assistance.
1
GREG JARBOE, YOUTUBE AND VIDEO MARKETING: AN HOUR A DAY 20 (2d ed.
2012).
2
See Beverly A. Berneman, Putting the Google Book Settlement in Perspective: Will
Looking for a Book Ever Be the Same Again?, in UNDERSTANDING COPYRIGHT LAW 2009 291,
291–93 (E. Leonard Rubin et al. eds., 2009) (beginning her discussion of the Google
Books Settlement in a historical context and analogizing the Google Books project to
a modern-day library of Alexandria).
3
Gregory K. Leonard, The Proposed Google Books Settlement: Copyright, Rule 23, and
DOJ Section 2 Enforcement, 24 ANTITRUST 26, 26 (2010), available at
http://www.nera.com/nera-files/PUB_Google_Books_Settlement_0710.pdf.
4
Jonathan Band, The Long and Winding Road to the Google Books Settlement, 9 J.
MARSHALL REV. INTELL. PROP. L. 227, 227 (2010).
5
Leonard, supra note 3, at 26.
6
See infra Part III (explaining in greater detail the general information in this
introductory paragraph).
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It is convenient to search through thousands of books online, and
without ever stepping foot into a library or bookstore. Copyright
holders, however, were not pleased; they brought claims of copyright
7
infringement against Google. The parties ultimately reached a
8
settlement, but the District Court for the Southern District of New
9
York did not approve the agreement.
With these digital resources increasing the immediacy and ease
of access to the everyman, copyright law is at a crossroads. Some
10
believe that the expansion of copyright law should be curtailed. For
example, Professor Lawrence Lessig states that “‘[i]f technology
creates efficient ways to charge commercial users of copyright, then
that’s good . . . but [not if] we evolve into a permission culture, where
11
every single use of music creates an obligation to pay.” Indeed, with
the advent of websites like YouTube, the general public’s interaction
12
with creative works has most likely increased.
YouTube enables
users to upload any video, copyrighted or otherwise, to the site for
viewing by others, without a license or permission from
13
rightsholders. From its beginnings as a personal video-sharing site,
YouTube is now “the world’s leading video community on the
14
Internet.” YouTube reports staggering statistics. Each month, more
than 800 million unique users watch videos on the site and users
15
upload seventy-two hours of video per minute.
This massive collection of videos provides the public with
convenient, on-demand access to video and music, but is fraught with
legal uncertainty. Members of the public may believe that a YouTube
16
video is in the public domain simply because it is on the site and
7

Id.
Order Granting Preliminary Approval of Amended Settlement Agreement at
2, The Authors Guild v. Google, Inc., 770 F. Supp. 2d 666 (S.D.N.Y. 2011) (No. 1:05cv-08136-DC), ECF No. 772.
9
The Authors Guild v. Google, Inc., 770 F. Supp. 2d 666, 669–70 (S.D.N.Y.
2011).
10
John Bowe, The Music-Copyright Enforcers, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 6, 2010 (Magazine),
at 5.
11
Id.
12
See Statistics, YOUTUBE, http://www.youtube.com/t/press_statistics (last visited
July 31, 2012).
13
See
Using
Copyrighted
Material
in
Your
Video,
YOUTUBE,
http://www.youtube.com/t/copyright_permissions (last visited Feb. 11, 2012).
14
JARBOE, supra note 1, at 20.
15
Statistics, supra note 12.
16
The public domain is
[t]he universe of inventions and creative works that are not protected
by intellectual-property rights and are therefore available for anyone to
8
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17

available online. Thus, these individuals might believe that they can
18
The doctrine of fair use
use the online content as they wish.
complicates the matter. Fair use creates an exception to general
copyright principles and allows the use of copyrighted material, in
certain circumstances, to further the policy purposes of “public
19
discourse and education[].” YouTube users’ rampant uploads of
20
copyrighted material prompted Viacom’s March 2007 lawsuit, in
21
which the rightsholder asserted direct and indirect infringement
22
The key issue in the case was the
claims against the website.
statutory interpretation of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act
(DMCA) of 1998’s safe harbor for service providers, codified at 17
23
U.S.C. §§ 512(c)(1)(A)(i) and (ii).
The court determined that
YouTube needed “actual or constructive knowledge of specific and
identifiable infringements of individual items” to be held liable,
instead of a “general awareness” of the presence of infringing

use without charge. When copyright, trademark, patent, or tradesecret rights are lost or expire, the intellectual property they had
protected becomes part of the public domain and can be appropriated
by anyone without liability for infringement.
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1349 (9th ed. 2009).
17
See Elizabeth Towsend Gard, Conversations with Renowned Professors on the Future
of Copyright, 12 TUL. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 35, 68 (2009).
18
See id.
19
Bruce E. H. Johnson & Maya Yamazaki, Copyright and the Internet, in
UNDERSTANDING COPYRIGHT LAW 2010 637, 639 (E. Leonard Rubin et al. eds., 2010).
20
Complaint at 1, Viacom Int’l Inc. v. YouTube, Inc., 718 F. Supp. 2d 514
(S.D.N.Y. 2010) (Nos. 07 Civ. 2103, 07 Civ. 3582).
21
To state a claim “of direct infringement: (1) [an individual] must show
ownership of the allegedly infringed material and (2) they must demonstrate that the
alleged infringers violate at least one exclusive right granted to copyright holders
under 17 U.S.C. § 106.” A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004, 1013 (9th
Cir. 2001). Contributory copyright infringement occurs when “one who, with
knowledge of the infringing activity, induces, causes or materially contributes to the
infringing conduct of another. . . .” Id. at 1019 (quoting Gershwin Publ’g Corp. v.
Columbia Artists Mgmt., Inc., 443 F.2d 1159, 1162 (2d Cir. 1971)). Vicarious liability
can be found where the defendant “has the right and ability to supervise the
infringing activity and also has a direct financial interest in such activities.” Id. at
1022 (quoting Fonovisa, Inc. v. Cherry Auction, Inc., 76 F.3d 259, 262 (9th Cir.
1996)).
22
First Amended Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief and Damages
and Demand for Jury Trial at 19–28, Viacom Int’l Inc. v. YouTube, Inc., 718 F. Supp.
2d 514 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) (Nos. 07 Civ. 2103, 07 Civ. 3582) [hereinafter First Amended
Complaint].
23
See 17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(1)(A)(i)–(ii) (2006); Viacom Int’l Inc. v. YouTube, Inc.,
718 F. Supp. 2d 514, 519 (S.D.N.Y. 2010). See infra Part II.C for a discussion of the
federal statutory safe harbor.
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24

content. If similar litigation arises in the future, there could be a
different and fairer resolution.
This Comment will argue that YouTube’s current methods of
handling potentially infringing content are insufficient and that an
ultimate resolution of copyright claims against YouTube might
include a settlement of future litigation that establishes a private body
to make fair use determinations of copyrighted work. Part II of this
Comment presents an overview of the sources of copyright law,
including the fair use exception, interpretive case law, and the
DMCA. Part III presents background information about the Google
Books litigation, a general overview of the terms of the failed Google
Books Settlement, and examples of other settlements of mass torts.
Part IV discusses the main YouTube copyright infringement case,
25
Viacom International Inc. v. YouTube, Inc., from the Southern District
of New York, and methods that YouTube and the rightsholders have
used to deal with use of copyrighted material. Part V presents the
potential application of a settlement-based analog to the Book Rights
26
Registry in the YouTube context.
II. THE FOUNDATIONS OF COPYRIGHT LAW
A. Background
Copyright law is rooted in the Constitution’s Patent and
Copyright Clause that grants Congress the power “[t]o promote the
Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to
Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings
27
and Discoveries.”
The Copyright Act of 1976 defines copyright
28
protection today. Enacted pursuant to the constitutional provision,
the Act protects “original works of authorship fixed in any tangible
medium of expression, now known or later developed, from which
they can be perceived, reproduced, or otherwise communicated,
29
either directly or with the aid of a machine or device.” Copyright,
however, does not protect the underlying idea or concept expressed
30
The Act gives the copyright holder the
in the creative work.

24
25
26
27
28
29
30

YouTube, 718 F. Supp. 2d at 523.
718 F. Supp. 2d 514 (S.D.N.Y. 2010).
See infra Part III.B for a description of the Book Rights Registry.
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
See 17 U.S.C. §§ 101–810 (2006).
§ 102(a).
See § 102(b).
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exclusive right to reproduce his work, to create “derivative works”
based upon it, to distribute it through multiple different methods, to
stage a performance of the work (if applicable), to display it to the
31
public, and to perform the work through digital audio transmission.
Although these copyright principles may seem basic in the abstract,
the doctrine of fair use significantly complicates the matter.
B. Fair Use
1.

An Overview of the Statutory Fair Use Factors

The general right to copyright is subject to a very important
exception—the doctrine of fair use. The Copyright Act of 1976
provides that use of a copyrighted work in certain instances is a
32
permissible, non-infringing fair use; examples include “criticism,
comment, news reporting, teaching (including multiple copies for
33
classroom use), scholarship, or research.” To determine whether a
use falls under this exception, courts consider four factors:
(1) the purpose and character of the use, including
whether such use is of a commercial nature or is for
nonprofit educational purposes;
(2) the nature of the copyrighted work;
(3) the amount and substantiality of the portion used in
relation to the copyrighted work as a whole; and
(4) the effect of the use upon the potential market for or
34
value of the copyrighted work.
Because Congress foresaw that new technology would alter the
definition of fair use, it left the statute open to judicial interpretation,
allowing the law to develop through individual cases and specific sets
35
of facts. As the legislative history reveals, “[t]he bill endorses the
purpose and general scope of the judicial doctrine of fair use, but
there is no disposition to freeze the doctrine in the statute, especially
36
during a period of rapid technological change.” Additionally, the
statute defines fair use broadly so that the courts can adapt the
37
doctrine to specific sets of facts. Fair use analysis is an “equitable
rule of reason,” in which courts should balance the interests of the
31
32
33
34
35
36
37

See § 106(1)–(6).
See § 107.
Id.
§ 107(1)–(4).
Edward Lee, Technological Fair Use, 83 S. CAL. L. REV. 797, 801 (2010).
H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 66 (1976).
Id.
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38

Courts’ Applications of the Fair Use Factors

Indeed, courts reach varying results when interpreting these
four factors. The Supreme Court has stated that when a court
considers “the purpose and character of the use,” the key issue is
“whether the new work merely ‘supersede[s] the objects’ of the
original creation, or instead adds something new, with a further
purpose or different character, altering the first with new expression,
39
meaning, or message[.]” Put differently, the inquiry is whether and
40
to what degree the work is “transformative.” The Ninth Circuit
explains that a transformative use is one that changes copyrighted
material or transforms the copyrighted work into a “new creation” by
41
using it in a “different context.” The court notes that the more the
new work transforms the copyrighted material, “the less important
42
the other factors, including commercialism, become.”
43
When examining “the nature of the copyrighted work,” the
Second Circuit states that courts should consider that copyright law
protects the reasonable expectations of the rightsholder and
44
creator.
It notes that the Supreme Court had declared that
copyright was meant to protect “creative expression for public
45
dissemination.” The Supreme Court in fact provides guidance on
this issue, stating that it is more likely that fair use occurs “‘in factual
works than in fictional works,’ whereas ‘a use is less likely to be
46
deemed fair when the copyrighted work is a creative product.’”
Thus, the more creative and expressive the work product is, the
38

Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 454–55 & n.40
(1984).
39
Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 579 (1994) (quoting Folsom
v. Marsh, 9 F. Cas. 342, 348 (C.C. D. Mass. 1841)).
40
Campbell, 510 U.S. at 579 (quoting Pierre N. Leval, Toward a Fair Use Standard,
103 HARV. L. REV. 1105, 1111 (1990)).
41
Perfect 10, Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 487 F.3d 701, 721 (9th Cir. 2007)
(quoting Wall Data, Inc. v. L.A. Cty. Sherriff’s Dept., 447 F.3d 769, 778 (9th Cir.
2006)).
42
Kelly v. Arriba Soft Corp. 336 F.3d 811, 818 (9th Cir. 2003) (citing Campbell,
510 U.S. at 579).
43
See Bill Graham Archives v. Dorling Kindersley, Ltd., 448 F.3d 605, 612 (2d
Cir. 2006) (quoting 17 U.S.C. § 107(2)).
44
See id. (citing Leval, supra note 40, at 1122).
45
Bill Graham Archives, 448 F.3d at 612 (quoting Campbell, 510 U.S. at 586).
46
A.V. ex rel. Vanderhye v. iParadigms, L.L.C., 562 F.3d 630, 640 (4th Cir. 2009)
(quoting Stewart v. Abend, 495 U.S. 207, 237 (1990) (internal quotation marks and
alteration omitted)).
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greater the degree of copyright protection it receives.
The third factor, “the amount and substantiality of the portion
used in relation to the copyrighted work as a whole,” requires
48
examination of both quantitative and qualitative factors.
The
Fourth Circuit notes that the greater the amount of copyrighted
49
material used, the less likely the use is a fair one.
The court
emphasizes, however, that examination of the quantity is not the end
50
of the inquiry. Courts must also consider the copyrighted material’s
51
“quality and importance.”
In other words, they must consider
52
whether the material was “the heart of the copyrighted work.” Thus,
the amount of legal reproduction of a copyrighted work depends on
53
“the purpose and character of the use.”
Finally, the Supreme Court has characterized the fourth factor,
“the effect of the use upon the potential market for or value of the
copyrighted work,” as the “single most important element of fair
54
use.” This is the case because copyright law’s main purpose is to
allow creators to reap the rewards of their labor and thereby
55
encourage creativity. Thus, it is not necessary to prohibit uses that
do not affect “the potential market for, or value of” the copyrighted
56
material.
Therefore, courts must “determine whether the
defendants’ use of plaintiffs’ works ‘would materially impair the
marketability of the work[s] and whether it would act as a market
57
substitute’ for them.”
As discussed later, the DMCA and the
technology that YouTube uses to comply with the statute
58
inadequately address this fair use exception.
These fair use provisions have been applied in major Supreme
Court cases addressing new technologies that had similarly disruptive
effects in markets for creative products. In Sony Corp. of America v.
47

Id. at 640 (quoting Bond v. Blum, 317 F.3d 385, 395 (4th Cir. 2003)).
Id. at 642 (quoting Campbell, 510 U.S. at 587).
49
Id. (quoting Bond, 317 F.3d at 396).
50
Id. (citing Campbell, 510 U.S. at 587).
51
Id. (quoting Campbell, 510 U.S. at 587) (internal quotation marks and
omitted).
52
iParadigms, 562 F.3d at 642 (citing Sundeman v. The Seajay Soc’y, Inc., 142
F.3d 194, 205 (4th Cir. 1998) (internal quotation marks omitted).
53
Id.
54
Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 566 (1985).
55
iParadigms, 562 F.3d at 642 (quoting Leval, supra note 40, at 1124).
56
Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 450 (1984).
57
iParadigms, 562 F.3d at 643 (quoting Bond v. Blum, 317 F.3d 385, 396 (4th Cir.
2003)).
58
See infra Parts II.C, III.B.
48
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Universal City Studios, Inc., Universal, Walt Disney, and other
59
Sony
rightsholders sued Sony for copyright infringement.
manufactured Betamax video tape recorders, which are devices used
by the public to record television broadcasts of Universal’s
60
copyrighted works.
Universal sought monetary relief, equitable
accounting of profits, and an injunction against the production and
61
marketing of the tape recorders. The issue was whether the sale of
these tape recorders violated any of Universal’s rights as a copyright
62
holder.
Significantly, the district court found that the average owner of
the tape recorder engages in “time-shifting,” the term used to
describe recording a program when it is aired in order to watch the
63
program later.
Time shifting actually increased the number of
people who viewed the program, so this was favorable to the
64
rightsholders of the content. Rightsholders who objected to this
practice could not demonstrate “impair[ment] . . . [of] the
commercial value of their copyrights or . . . cre[ation of] any
65
likelihood of future harm.” The Supreme Court concluded that this
66
constituted fair use of the copyrighted material.
As to the first fair use factor, “the commercial or nonprofit
character of an activity,” the Court pointed to the district court’s
finding that time shifting for use in the home was a “noncommercial,
67
nonprofit activity.” Analyzing the second factor, “the nature of the
copyrighted work,” in conjunction with the third factor, “the amount
and substantiality of the portion used in relation to the copyrighted
work as a whole,” the Court noted that the viewer had already been
given the opportunity to view the work for free because it was
68
Thus, the Court held that copying the
broadcast on television.
69
entire work did not weigh against a finding of fair use.
When discussing the fourth factor, “the effect of the use upon
the potential market for or value of the copyrighted work,” the Court
59
60
61
62
63
64
65
66
67
68
69

Sony, 464 U.S. at 420.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 423.
Id. at 443.
Sony, 464 U.S. at 421.
Id. at 455.
Id. at 449.
Id.
See id. at 450.
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observed that copyright law incentivizes an individual to engage in
70
creative activity. The Court noted, however, that a use that does not
affect the “market for, or value of, the copyrighted work” does not
need to be made illegal, because individuals still have the same
71
incentive to create new works after such a use. Thus, the Court
explained, to challenge a noncommercial use, the proponent must
demonstrate by a preponderance of the evidence that “some
72
meaningful likelihood of future harm exists.”
In Sony, the Court held that the respondents did not
demonstrate that time-shifting created this meaningful likelihood of
73
future harm. It ruled that the district court’s factual findings amply
74
supported a fair use determination. The district court found that
the rightsholders did not show potential future harm, rejecting their
75
numerous contentions. The court rejected claims (1) that timeshifting viewers were not counted in viewership, decreasing revenues
and ratings, because technology accounts for these viewers; (2) that
live viewership will decrease as audiences watch taped programs
because there were no facts to support the assertion; (3) that timeshifting will decrease the amount of people who watch reruns
because time-shifting “should aid plaintiffs rather than harm them”;
and (4) that box office sales and rental revenue would decrease
76
because there was no merit to the assertion. Finally, no actual harm
77
had been suffered.
The Sony case provided the backdrop for the Ninth Circuit’s fair
78
use analysis in A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc.
In Napster,
rightsholders in the recording industry sued Napster for contributory
79
and vicarious copyright infringement.
Napster allowed users to
search for MP3 files located in the files of other computers connected
80
to the Napster network.
After locating the desired music, users
could download a copy of the MP3 and share the music “peer-to-

70
71
72
73
74
75
76
77
78
79
80

Id.
Sony, 464 U.S. at 450.
Id. at 451 (emphasis in original).
Id.
See id. at 451–55.
Id. at 452–53.
Id.
Sony, 464 U.S. at 454.
239 F.3d 1004 (9th Cir. 2001).
Id. at 1011.
Id. at 1012.
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81

peer.” Rightsholders claimed that Napster users engaged in direct
82
copyright infringement by copying and distributing an MP3.
83
Napster, however, claimed that its activity was fair use. The
84
Ninth Circuit, examining the district court’s findings for clear error,
concluded that the lower court did not err when it found that
85
Napster users’ actions were not fair use.
When examining the
purpose and character of the use, the district court found that
86
downloading an MP3 is a non-transformative commercial use. The
district court found a commercial use because sending an MP3 to
another cannot be a personal use and because recipients of the files
87
were able to obtain the MP3 without purchasing them. The Ninth
88
Circuit found no clear error in the lower court’s holdings.
Next, when analyzing the nature of the use, the Ninth Circuit
found no clear error in the district court’s determination that the
files were “creative in nature . . . which cuts against a finding of fair
89
use . . . .” The court then considered the district court’s analysis of
90
the third factor, the portion of the work used. The district court
determined that there was “wholesale copying” of copyrighted
material because the MP3 files must be copied in order to be
91
transferred. The Ninth Circuit acknowledged the Sony case, stating
that “under certain circumstances, a court will conclude that a use is
92
fair even when the protected work is copied in its entirety.” Here,
however, the court agreed with the district court’s finding that
93
copying mitigated against finding fair use. Finally, in analyzing the
81

Id. Peer-to-peer music sharing allows users with the same or similar file
sharing programs to create a network of computers and share files with other users
on that network. Fed. Trade Comm’n, Peer-to-Peer Filing Sharing: A Guide for Business,
BUREAU
OF
CONSUMER
PROTECTION
BUSINESS
CENTER,
http://business.ftc.gov/documents/bus46-peer-peer-file-sharing-guidebusiness#Whatis (last visited Apr. 10, 2012).
82
Napster, 239 F.3d at 1013.
83
See id. at 1014–19.
84
Id. at 1015.
85
Id.
86
Id.
87
Id.
88
Napster, 239 F.3d at 1015.
89
Id. at 1016 (citing A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster. Inc., 114 F. Supp. 2d 896, 913
(N.D. Cal. 2000)).
90
Id., 239 F.3d at 1016.
91
Id.
92
Id. (citing Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 451
(1984)).
93
Id.
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“effect of the use on the market,” the district court found that
Napster hurts the market by reducing college-student CD purchases
94
and hinders the rightsholders’ entry in to the digital-music market.
Napster contended that the district court erred by not deeming
95
96
sampling and space-shifting fair uses.
For purposes of this
Comment and in light of the Sony case, the more relevant of these
uses is space-shifting, which “occurs when a Napster user downloads
MP3 music files in order to listen to music he already owns on audio
97
CD.” Napster pointed to Sony, claiming that the Supreme Court had
98
previously held that space-shifting is fair use. The Ninth Circuit,
however, held that the district court erred when it decided that Sony
99
did not control. The court explained that “the methods of shifting
in these cases did not also simultaneously involve distribution of the
copyrighted material to the general public; the time or space-shifting
of copyrighted material exposed the material only to the original
100
user.”
The Ninth Circuit emphasized that in Sony the Supreme
Court noted that the copyrighted recorded materials were for
101
personal use and not shared with members of the public.
C. New Technology: The Digital Millennium Copyright Act
As the previous section illustrates, applying existing law to new
technology is a difficult endeavor. Congress responded to this
complex situation with legislation by passing the Digital Millennium
Copyright Act of 1998 and extending copyright protection to
102
Internet material.
The DMCA’s purpose was “to make digital
networks safe places to disseminate and exploit copyrighted
103
While protecting copyrighted works and explaining
materials.”
service providers’ liability, the DMCA allows the emerging market for
these works to develop and allows for Internet access to creative

94

Napster, 239 F.3d at 1016.
Sampling occurs when “users make temporary copies of a work before
purchasing” it. Id. at 1014.
96
Id. at 1017.
97
Id. at 1018.
98
Id. Napster also cited Recording Indus. Ass’n of Am. v. Diamond Multimedia
Sys, Inc., 180 F.3d 1072 (9th Cir. 1999), to support its claim. Id. at 1019.
99
Id. at 1019.
100
Napster, 239 F.3d at 1019.
101
Id.
102
Johnson & Yamazaki, supra note 19, at 639.
103
S. REP. NO. 105-190, at 2 (1998) (codified at 17 U.S.C. § 512 (2006)).
95
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104

works. A statutory safe harbor for Internet service providers is built
into the DMCA so that in certain cases, the providers can avoid
105
liability. In order to invoke its protection, “a service provider must
reasonably implement a system that terminates accounts of repeat
106
infringers.”
The procedure must: (1) not obstruct “standard
technical measures” that copyright owners use “to identify or protect”
their works; (2) be the product of collaboration between
rightsholders and service providers; (3) be available to parties who
need it; and (4) not be substantially costly or burdensome to the
107
service providers.
This means that the procedures the service
providers implement must be a product of a compromise between
the service providers and the rightsholders.
A frequently litigated issue is whether another safe harbor, set
108
forth in 17 U.S.C. § 512(c), applies. This provision is referred to as
109
the “notice and take down provision.” The provision allows service
providers to avoid liability when they store information uploaded by
110
To invoke this protection, the service provider must meet
users.
certain qualifications. It must “not have actual knowledge” that
111
material or an activity is infringing a copyright and also must not
know of “facts and circumstances from which infringing activity is
112
apparent.”
Alternatively, if the service provider becomes aware of
the infringing material on the site, it must “expeditiously” remove or
113
The provider must not profit from
prevent access to the content.

104

See id.
17 U.S.C. § 512. A “service provider” is “a provider of online services or
network access, or the operator of facilities therefor[,]” which includes an “entity
offering the transmission, routing, or providing of connections for digital online
communications, between or among points specified by a user, of material of the
user’s choosing, without modification to the content of the material as sent or
received.” § 512(k)(1)(B). This statute is at the core of Viacom International, Inc. v.
YouTube, Inc., 718 F. Supp. 2d 514 (S.D.N.Y. 2010), where the court concluded that
YouTube qualified for this safe harbor. See discussion infra Part IV.
106
Johnson & Yamazaki, supra note 19, at 641 (citing § 512(i)).
107
§ 512(i)(2).
108
See Johnson & Yamazaki, supra note 19, at 641 (citing cases analyzing whether
the safe harbor applies).
109
Lateef Mtima, Whom the Gods Would Destroy: Why Congress Prioritized Copyright
Protection Over Internet Privacy in Passing the Digital Millennium Copyright Act, 61
RUTGERS L. REV. 627, 655–56 (2009) (citing Recording Indus. Ass’n of Am., Inc. v.
Verizon Internet Serv., Inc., 351 F.3d 1229, 1234 (D.C. Cir. 2003)).
110
§ 512(c)(1).
111
§ 512(c)(1)(A)(i).
112
§ 512(c)(1)(A)(ii).
113
§ 512(c)(1)(A)(iii).
105
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114

the infringement.
Finally, if the service provider is notified of
115
The
infringing material on the site, it must remove the material.
service provider must appoint a “designated agent” must be
appointed to handle infringement notifications, and his contact
116
information must be available online and at the Copyright Office.
Courts have interpreted the safe harbor and applied it to many
117
situations. In Perfect 10, Inc. v. CCBill LLC, the defendants were web
hosts that posted pictures, stolen by others, from the plaintiff’s
118
website.
The plaintiff, who was “the publisher of an adult
119
entertainment magazine and the owner of” an adult website,
argued that usage of site names like “illegal.net” were red flags that
120
signified infringing use.
The Ninth Circuit refused to place the
burden on the service provider to determine if pictures on their
121
Similarly, in UMG Recordings, Inc. v. Veoh
server were illegal.
122
Networks, Inc., the Central District of California stated that if a
service provider needed to investigate whether its website contained
infringing material, then its minimal knowledge did not rise to the
123
124
level of a red flag. In Corbis Corp. v. Amazon.com, Inc., the Western
District of Washington stated that “‘[t]he issue is not whether
Amazon had a general awareness [but rather] . . . whether Amazon
actually knew that specific . . . vendors were selling items that
125
infringed Corbis copyrights.”
126
The recent trademark case, Tiffany (NJ) Inc. v. eBay, Inc., is also
analogous to the cases discussed above. The issue in that case was
127
whether eBay was liable for contributory trademark infringement.
The court considered whether eBay knew or had reason to know that
sellers were infringing Tiffany’s trademark by selling counterfeit

114

§ 512(c)(1)(B).
§ 512(c)(1)(C). The notification requirements are set forth in § 512(3).
116
See § 512(c)(2).
117
488 F.3d 1102 (9th Cir. 2007).
118
Id. at 1108.
119
Id.
120
Id. at 1114.
121
Id.
122
665 F. Supp. 2d 1099 (C.D. Cal. 2009).
123
Id. at 1108.
124
351 F. Supp. 2d 1090 (W.D. Wash. 2004).
125
Id. at 1108.
126
600 F.3d 93 (2d Cir. 2010).
127
Id. at 97–98; see Viacom Int’l, Inc. v. YouTube, Inc., 718 F. Supp. 2d 514, 516
(S.D.N.Y. 2010).
115

MCSKIMMING.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

1758

11/12/2012 3:00 PM

[Vol. 42:1745

SETON HALL LAW REVIEW
128

goods while still allowing the sellers to use the site.
The district
court found that eBay had generalized notice of users who sold
counterfeit goods but dismissed the case, holding that general
knowledge was not enough to “impose upon eBay an affirmative duty
129
to remedy the problem.”
The Second Circuit agreed, requiring
“knowledge of which particular listings are infringing or will infringe
in the future” for a service provider to be liable for contributory
130
trademark infringement.
Although this was a trademark case, in
both the YouTube and Tiffany cases, there was evidence that much of
the material on each site was illegal—either infringing video or audio
131
on YouTube or counterfeit Tiffany merchandise on eBay.
The
Second Circuit noted that the service providers’ duties under the
DCMA are analogous to those in the trademark infringement
132
context.
That statute requires removal of infringing material only
when the owner identifies such material; however, “general
knowledge” of infringement occurring on the site “does not impose a
duty on the service provider to monitor or search its service for
133
infringements.” These cases indicate that the service provider, even
when generally aware of a large amount of infringing activity, is not
required to locate individual instances of infringement and remove
134
the infringing content from its service.
D. Looking to the Future
Some commentators argue that copyright law requires large135
scale reform. Professor Pamela Samuelson, for example, desires to
use the experience gained since 1976 to make a broad change to the
copyright law and adapt it to new technologies to protect purely
136
digital works and industries. The process would take many years of
preparation, however, before Congress could even be asked to
128

Tiffany, 600 F.3d at 97–98; see YouTube, 718 F. Supp. 2d at 525.
Tiffany, 600 F.3d at 107 (citing Tiffany (NJ) Inc. v. eBay, Inc., 576 F. Supp. 2d
463, 508 (S.D.N.Y. 2008)).
130
Id.
131
See YouTube, 718 F. Supp. 2d at 524.
132
Id. (quoting Tiffany, 600 F.3d at 97–98).
133
Id.
134
See YouTube, 718 F. Supp. 2d at 524–25.
135
See e.g., Warren B. Chik, Paying It Forward: The Case for a Specific Statutory
Limitation on Exclusive Rights for User-Generated Content Under Copyright Law, 11 J.
MARSHALL REV. INTELL. PROP. L. 240 (2011); Michael J. Madison, Rewriting Fair Use
and the Future of Copyright Reform, 23 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 391 (2005); Pamela
Samuelson, Preliminary Thoughts on Copyright Reform, 2007 UTAH L. REV. 551 (2007).
136
Samuelson, supra note 135, at 555.
129
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137

legislate.
Therefore, this type of reform may be years in the
138
Samuelson predicts that neither the Copyright Office nor
future.
139
Congress will take action in the next decade. She believes that the
United States is facing more serious problems, like global conflict,
climate change, and more pressing reforms of tax and immigration
140
law.
In addition, the industries that are protected under the current
141
law are not entirely dissatisfied with the existing framework.
Importantly, those dealing with copyrights—for example artists,
businesspeople, or attorneys—are familiar with the system and may
142
fear being subject to a new regime.
Individuals with the most
influence over potential copyright legislation would likely not want to
change the current law, as they would be averse to establishing a new
system that could displace their advantage and shift the balance of
143
power.
Finally, to modify the Copyright Act of 1976 would cost
both time and money and would require policymakers to address
controversial issues, much like those grappled with during the
144
legislative process leading up to the DMCA.
III. GOOGLE BOOKS AND THE FAILED SETTLEMENT
A. The Google Books Controversy
Though the court did not approve the proposed settlement that
followed the Google Books litigation, a single provision of the
settlement could provide a model for the resolution of copyright
claims in the YouTube context. In order to understand this proposed
settlement, it is necessary to first explain the Google Books Search,
137

Id. at 556. Samuelson explained that
a copyright reform project focused on revision of the 1976 Act would
require a considerable investment of effort from many people, would
cost a good deal of money, and would bring to the surface many highly
contentious issues, such as those that manifested themselves in the
legislative struggles that led to the Digital Millennium Copyright Act of
1998. Even modest reform efforts . . . have encountered difficulties in
reaching consensus.

138

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Samuelson, supra note 135, at 556.
Id.
Id.

Id.
139
140
141
142
143
144
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the litigation that resulted, and the main provisions of the failed
settlement agreement.
As mentioned in Part I, Google scanned the collections of major
research libraries, which prompted copyright holders to file suit in
145
the Southern District of New York. Two actions were originally filed
146
in 2005 : a class action brought on September 20 by The Authors
Guild and other authors on behalf of those whose books were in the
University of Michigan’s library, and another suit brought on
147
148
October 19 by five book publishers. The cases were consolidated.
The plaintiffs claimed that Google infringed plaintiffs’ copyrights by
scanning the full text of millions of copyrighted books and creating a
database of searchable digital books without rightsholders’
149
permission.
Through Google’s search engine, users could enter
relevant information, like title or author, and search results would
150
include “snippets” of the scanned books.
Before the court could
rule on the merits, however, the parties reached a settlement
151
agreement in October 2008, and the court granted preliminary
152
approval of the proposed amended settlement in November 2009.
Some commentators saw the case as an important tool for
153
clarifying fair use in digital technologies. As noted in Part II.B, fair

145

Band, supra note 4, at 234.
Hearing on Competition and Commerce in Digital Books: The Proposed Google
Book Settlement Before the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 111th Cong. 1 (2009) [hereinafter
Hearings] (statement of Marybeth Peters, Register of Copyrights), available at
http://judiciary.house.gov/hearings/pdf/Peters090910.pdf.
147
Band, supra note 4, at 234. The Authors Guild describes itself as “the nation’s
leading advocate for writers’ interests in effective copyright protection, fair contracts
and free expression . . . [providing] legal assistance and a broad range of web
services to its members.”
ABOUT: HISTORY OF THE AUTHORS GUILD,
http://www.authorsguild.org/about.html (last visited Oct. 20, 2010).
148
Band, supra note 4, at 234.
149
Id. at 227.
150
Id. at 231–32.
151
Press Release, Google, Authors, Publishers, and Google Reach Landmark
Settlement: Copyright Accord Would Make Millions More Books Available Online,
GOOGLE.COM (Oct. 28, 2008), http://www.google.com/intl/en/press/pressrel
/20081027_booksearchagreement.html.
152
Order Granting Preliminary Approval of Amended Settlement Agreement at
2, The Authors Guild v. Google, Inc., 770 F. Supp. 2d 666 (S.D.N.Y. 2011) (No. 1:05cv-08136-DC), ECF No. 772.
153
MICHAEL M. LAFEBER & LINDSEY D. SAUNDERS, COPYRIGHT PROTECTION IN THE
DIGITAL AGE: GOOGLE BOOK SETTLEMENT AND BEYOND, ABA INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
ROUNDTABLE 3–4 (2008), available at http://www.abanet.org/litigation/committees
/intellectual/roundtables/1108_outline.pdf.
146
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154

use is doctrinally unclear, and with such high stakes involved in
litigation, like costs and damages, guidelines for digital technology
155
have not been established by courts through cases. Because Google
had the financial capability to litigate such a case and was willing to
take risks, the potential for a judicial resolution to the fair use issue
156
was promising.
B. The Proposed Settlement
As Allan Adler, vice president of the Association of American
Publishers, remarked:
[T]his proposed settlement is really unprecedented in its
scope and nature . . . . [W]hat we have here is not only a
settlement agreement that will resolve the pending
litigation, but it’s designed deliberately to establish and
create a going forward model for publishers and authors
and other rightsholders in books to work with one of the
giants of the online world to move books online for
157
purposes of providing access to a new readership.
The expansiveness of the settlement is related to the certified
class in the litigation, which includes “all persons and entities that, as
of January 5, 2009, own a U.S. copyright interest in one or more
Books or Inserts that are ‘implicated by a use’ authorized by the
158
Amended Settlement.” A person owns a copyright “implicated by a
159
use” if Google will be using the book in its book search.
Correspondingly, the proposed settlement was complex and
comprised of many detailed parts. An in-depth description is beyond
the scope of this Comment; a brief overview, however, is needed to
give context to the provision of the settlement that would have
160
created the Book Rights Registry.
Generally, Google could still
have both displayed portions of protected material and continued to
154

Id.
Id.
156
Id.
157
Objection of Scott E. Gant to Proposed Settlement, and to Certification of the
Proposed Settlement Class and Sub-Classes at 8, The Authors Guild v. Google, Inc.,
770 F. Supp. 2d 666 (S.D.N.Y. 2011) (No. 1:05-cv-08136-DC), ECF No. 143
(alterations in original) (quoting Allan Adler, Vice President of the Association of
American Publishers).
158
FAQs, GOOGLE BOOK SETTLEMENT, http://www.googlebooksettlement.com
/help/bin/answer.py?hl=en&answer=118704#q2 (last visited Feb. 11, 2012)
[hereinafter FAQs].
159
Id.
160
See infra Part III.C (discussing the Book Rights Registry in greater detail).
155
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161

copy more books from those libraries that offered their collections.
The Book Rights Registry would have recorded generated revenue
162
Entities like
and, in turn, would have paid the rightsholders.
libraries or schools could have purchased subscriptions to the entire
163
database of scanned books for use by their patrons or students.
Further, a rightsholder could create a licensing agreement with other
164
companies, even if his work was included in Google Books.
Additionally, if a rightsholder did not want to be included in the
settlement, he could opt-out of all of the settlement’s terms,
including the database of scanned books, the Book Rights Registry,
165
and the copyright payment plan.
Similarly, if he did not want a
work displayed through the search or included in the collection, he
166
could restrict access to it whenever he desired to do so.
C. The Book Rights Registry
The Book Rights Registry would have been vital to the success of
the settlement agreement because it would have administered the
agreement’s provisions and acted as an intermediary between
167
rightsholders and Google.
Google described the Book Rights
Registry as a not-for-profit and independent organization whose sole
purpose would have been to “locat[e] rightsholders, collect[] and
maintain[] accurate rightsholder information, provid[e] a way for
rightsholders to request inclusion in or exclusion from the project,
distribut[e] payments earned from online access provided by Google,
and represent[] rightsholders’ interests in connection with similar
168
programs that may be established by other providers.”
To receive
payments, authors and publishers would have had to take part in the
169
The board of directors of the Book Rights
Book Rights Registry.
Registry would have been comprised of both author and publisher
170
representatives.
The Authors Guild and the Association of
171
American Publishers would have appointed these directors.
This
161
162
163
164
165
166
167
168
169
170
171

See Hearings, supra note 146, at 4 (statement of Marybeth Peters).
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
See FAQs, supra note 158.
FAQs, supra note 158.
Id.
Id. at 671.
ISABEL HOWE, HOW THE AUTHORS GUILD V. GOOGLE SETTLEMENT WILL WORK,
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registry would not only have benefitted the Google Books Project, but
also would have been used in similar potential projects by other
172
corporations. Google would have paid $34.5 million to cover start173
up costs,
and continued funding would have come from its
174
The settlement allocated forty-five million dollars for
revenue.
payments to rightsholders, ranging from sixty dollars for a
rightsholder of a whole book, or “principal work,” and smaller
175
amounts for smaller items included within works.
The Google Book Search litigation illustrates the conflict
between, on the one side, copyright holders and a print-based market
and, on the other, new technologies and the digital age. The
litigation between Viacom and YouTube exposes similar tension
among the Internet video-hosting website, the end-users who upload
content to the site, and the rightsholders of copyrighted material on
the website. As discussed below, this tension cannot be easily
176
resolved.
D. The Google Book Settlement’s Eventual Rejection
On March 22, 2011, the Southern District of New York rejected
177
In doing so, the court evaluated the
the proposed settlement.
178
Circuit courts typically
proposal by applying the Grinnell factors.
use these factors to determine whether a settlement is fair and, in
179
turn, whether it should be approved.
The court applied the
Grinnell factors to determine whether the settlement was “fair,
reasonable, and adequate” as required by Federal Rule of Civil
180
Procedure 23(e). These factors are:
(1) the complexity, expense, and likely duration of the
litigation;
(2) the reaction of the class to the settlement;
(3) the stage of the proceedings and the amount of
http://www.authorsguild.org/advocacy/articles/settlement-resources.attachment
/how-the-settlement-will/How%20the%20Settlement%20Will%20Work.pdf
(last
visited Feb. 11, 2012).
172
FAQs, supra note 158.
173
Id.
174
HOWE, supra note 171.
175
The Authors Guild v. Google, Inc., 770 F. Supp. 2d 666, 672 (S.D.N.Y. 2011).
176
See discussion infra Part IV.
177
The Authors Guild v. Google, Inc., 770 F. Supp. 2d 666, 669 (S.D.N.Y. 2011).
178
Id. at 674.
179
Alexandra Lahav, Fundamental Principles for Class Action Governance, 37 IND. L.
REV. 35, 111 n.221 (2003).
180
Authors Guild, 770 F. Supp. 2d at 674.
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discovery completed;
(4) the risks of establishing liability;
(5) the risks of establishing damages;
(6) the risks of maintaining a class action through trial;
(7) the ability of defendants to withstand greater judgment;
(8) the range of reasonableness of the settlement fund in
light of the best possible recovery; and
(9) the range of reasonableness of the settlement fund in
181
light of the attendant risks of litigation.
The court noted that most of these factors indicated that the
182
settlement should be approved.
There was extensive negotiation
between highly competent parties and litigating the case would be
183
complicated and would require a great amount of time and money.
184
The litigation had already been pending for years.
Additionally,
there was a high probability that the plaintiffs would lose at trial and
185
Thus, the court
that the class itself could not be maintained.
concluded that the financial elements of the settlement were
186
reasonable in light of the risks presented.
The court stated,
however, that the second Grinnell factor, the reaction of the class to
187
the settlement, was key.
The court explained that “[n]ot only are
the objections great in number, some of the concerns are significant.
Further, an extremely high number of class members—some 6800—
188
opted out.”
The court noted multiple practical problems that rendered the
settlement impossible. It stated that there was “a substantial question
as to the existence of antagonistic interest between named plaintiffs
189
and certain members of the class.”
Additionally, it found the
second part of the settlement problematic because it would “transfer
to Google certain rights in exchange for future ongoing
arrangements . . . and would release Google (and others) from
190
liability for certain future acts.” The court specified that Congress—
not a private settlement agreement—should determine treatment of
181

Id. (quoting City of Detroit v. Grinnell Corp., 495 F.2d 448, 463 (2d Cir. 1974)
(internal citations omitted)).
182
Id. at 675.
183
Id.
184
Id.
185
Authors Guild, 770 F. Supp. 2d at 675–76.
186
Id. at 676.
187
Id.
188
Id.
189
Id.
190
Id. (emphasis in original).
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orphan works.
Additionally, the settlement “would release claims
192
The court noted
well beyond those contemplated by pleadings.”
that the case truly centered on claims about scanned clips of books
and not the wholesale online availability of copyrighted books in the
193
future, as contemplated by the settlement.
The court also stated
that the interests of the class members were not adequately
represented because while academics favored availability of
information, others, like the named plaintiffs The Authors Guild and
194
the Association of American Publishers, did not.
The opt-out
195
provision raised significant concerns. The court focused on the fact
that to avoid being covered by the settlement rightsholders would
have to opt out; otherwise, they would lose their rights without ever
196
agreeing to transfer them.
The court asserted that rightsholders
should not have to affirmatively protect their works after Google
197
It also stated that the
copied them without their consent.
settlement would allow Google to dominate the search market,
198
raising antitrust concerns.
Finally, the court noted that
international legal implications were unclear and this uncertainty was
199
enough, in light of the other issues, to be problematic.
While the settlement in its current form has been rejected, it
seems the greater legal implications of the opt-out provision and
Google’s unauthorized copying activities were most problematic. A
settlement utilizing private ordering to determine appropriate usage
of copyrighted works on YouTube, as discussed infra, does not have
the broad-ranging implications of the Google Books Settlement.
Other settlements, however, provide examples of mechanisms used to
make binding determinations on class members.
191

Authors Guild, 770 F. Supp. 2d at 677–78.
Orphan works are works that are protected by copyright but for which
a potential user cannot identify or locate the copyright owner for the
purpose of securing permission. They do not include works that are in
the public domain; works for which a copyright owner is findable but
refuses permission; or works for which no permission is necessary, i.e.,
the use is within the parameters of an exception or limitation such as
fair use.
Hearing, supra note 146, at 8 (statement of Marybeth Peters).
192
Authors Guild, 770 F. Supp. 2d at 678.
193
Id.
194
Id at 679–80.
195
Id. at 681.
196
Id. at 681–82.
197
Id. at 682.
198
Authors Guild, 770 F. Supp. 2d at 682–83.
199
Id. 684–85.
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D. Other Settlement Examples
In other cases, settlements have included a private body or
council that administers claims or makes threshold determinations
about plaintiffs. These bodies could serve as a model for the
settlement if future copyright litigation arises in the YouTube
context.
1.

Vioxx Litigation

The ultimate resolution of the Vioxx litigation involved a
200
settlement in which a committee determined claimants’ awards.
This litigation itself arose out of a study of the drug, entitled the
201
Vioxx Gastrointestinal Outcomes Research, or “VIGOR,” and what
the drug’s pharmaceutical manufacturer, Merck, did after its
202
release.
Scientists at Merck voiced concerns about Vioxx’s blood
203
Released in 2000, VIGOR
clotting effect years before the study.
revealed that patients taking Vioxx were approximately five times
204
more likely to suffer a heart attack than people taking Naproxen.
After VIGOR was published in the New England Journal of Medicine,
Merck did not take any investigatory action or warn doctors of the
205
risk.
Instead, the drug company resisted the FDA’s attempts to
require a warning, continued to expand marketing of the drug, and
206
Finally, in 2004,
purposefully downplayed any safety concerns.
another study showed that Vioxx caused an increased risk of heart
207
disease and Merck removed the drug from commerce.
208
After multidistrict litigation, the parties reached a settlement.
Merck established a four billion dollar compensation fund for
patients that suffered heart attacks and a $850 million dollar fund for
209
those who suffered strokes. Plaintiffs had to enroll in a program to
210
become eligible for proceeds from the fund. Individuals and those
200

Howard M. Erichson & Benjamin C. Zipursky, Consent Versus Disclosure, 96
CORNELL L. REV. 265, 279 (2011).
201
W. John Thomas, The Vioxx Story: Would it Have Ended Differently in the European
Union?, 32 AM. J.L. & MED. 365, 369 (2006).
202
Id. at 276–78.
203
Id. at 276.
204
Id.
205
Id.
206
Id.
207
Erichson & Zipursky, supra note 200, at 277.
208
Id. at 277–78.
209
Id. at 279.
210
Id.
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suing on behalf of a decedent were required to show that they or the
decedent suffered a heart attack or stroke and took a particular
211
dosage of the drug over a certain amount of time.
Importantly, a “gate committee” then assessed each of the
plaintiff’s cases to decide whether he or she was eligible to receive
212
compensation.
The committee was composed of three drug
213
After
company representatives and three plaintiff representatives.
the threshold determination of eligibility, a claims administrator
214
assigned each plaintiff a certain number of points.
The
administrator awarded points based on the severity of the heart attack
215
or stroke and the duration of the plaintiff’s usage of the drug. The
more severe the health effects and longer the plaintiff ingested
216
Vioxx, the more points he or she would be given.
Conversely,
plaintiffs who were overweight or had a family history of heart disease
or diabetes, and that were at a higher risk for heart attack or stroke
217
were given fewer points than others.
These point totals translated
218
into dollars awarded per plaintiff.
2.

Breast Implant Litigation

Similarly, through the settlement process in Lindsey v. Dow
Corning Corp., a settlement office was created to make determinations
219
Plaintiffs injured by implantation of silicone breast
about claims.
211

Id.
Id.
213
Erichson & Zipursky, supra note 200, at 279.
214
Id. If the claims administrator denies a plaintiff eligibility, a committee
reviews the decision. Description of Settlement Agreement, OFFICIAL VIOXX SETTLEMENT,
http://www.officialvioxxsettlement.com/documents/Description%20of
%20Settlement.pdf (last visited Feb. 11, 2012). If the committee agrees with the
administrator’s determination, the plaintiff can pursue a tort claim, suffer dismissal
of his claim after thirty days of inaction, or appeal the decision to a Special Master.
See id. The Special Master reviews the entire claim de novo. Id. If the Special Master
also deems the plaintiff ineligible, the plaintiff’s claim is dismissed and is given no
legal recourse. Id. If, however, the plaintiff wins this appeal of last resort, the claim
proceeds. Id.
215
Id.
216
Erichson & Zipursky, supra note 200, at 279.
217
Id.
218
See id. To obtain the dollar value per point, the entire amount of the fund was
divided by the total points awarded. Id. Each plaintiff’s total points were then
multiplied by this dollar amount to determine how much money each would receive.
Id.
219
See THE OFFICE OF THE SETTLEMENT FACILITY-DOW CORNING TRUST, CLAIMANT
INFORMATION GUIDE: DOW CORNING BREAST IMPLANT CLAIMANTS (CLASS 5) 26 (2002),
available at http://www.tortcomm.org/downloads/CLASS%205%20CLAIMAINT
212
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220

implants filed suit against the manufacturer, Dow Corning.
After
the 1994 settlement, Dow Corning’s declaration of bankruptcy, and a
revised settlement in 1995, the plaintiffs accepted $3.2 billion dollars
221
in settlement funds in 1998. The settlement involved various classes
of claimants classified according to national citizenship or residence,
222
location of the implant surgery, and what type of implant received.
For example, members of Class 5 were the “Domestic Dow Corning
223
Breast Implant Claimants.”
These women had received a breast
implant made by Dow Corning and were United States citizens,
224
resident aliens, or had undergone surgery in the United States.
These plaintiffs were eligible to receive different amounts of
compensation—a $5,000 explant payment, a $25,000 rupture
225
payment, and a $2,000 expedited release payment.
Alternatively, the Medically Contraindicated Exception to the
rupture payment is, as its name implies, an exception to the required
226
demonstration of proof for this $25,000 payment.
A plaintiff can
receive this money without having her implants removed if she
227
satisfies six criteria.
The claims administrator makes the
%20INFORMATION%20GUIDE.pdf [hereinafter CLAIMANT INFORMATION GUIDE].
220
JAY TIDMARSH, FED. JUDICIAL CTR., MASS TORT SETTLEMENT CLASS ACTIONS: FIVE
CASE
STUDIES
75–76
(1998),
available
at
http://www.fjc.gov/public/pdf.nsf/lookup/Tidmarsh.pdf/$file/Tidmarsh.pdf.
221
FRONTLINE:
BREAST
IMPLANTS
ON
TRIAL,
http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/implants/cron.html (last visited Jan. 15,
2011).
222
CLAIMANT INFORMATION GUIDE, supra note 219, at 2–3.
223
Id. at 3. This group is different from those who are Disease Claimants in Class
5, who, under the “The Disease Payment Option,” sought payments of $12,000–
$300,000. To recover, they must submit medical records demonstrating that they
suffer from certain enumerated diseases caused by the implants. THE OFFICE OF THE
SETTLEMENT FACILITY-DOW CORNING TRUST, DISEASE CLAIMANT INFORMATION GUIDE:
DOW CORNING BREAST IMPLANT CLAIMANTS (CLASS 5) 2–3 (2002), available at
http://www.tortcomm.org/downloads/Disease%20CIG_ENG_5.pdf.
224
CLAIMANT INFORMATION GUIDE, supra note 219, at 3.
225
Id. at 5. The explant payment is payment to those demonstrating that the
implant was removed within a certain time period; the rupture payment is an
additional payment to those demonstrating that the removed implant had ruptured;
and the expedited release payment simply requires proof of implantation of a Dow
Corning implant. Id.
226
See id. at 26–28.
227
Id. The criteria are: specific proof that Dow Corning is the manufacturer; a
doctor’s statement and diagnosis accompanied by medical documentation of the
“serious chronic medical condition” that makes surgical removal impossible;
objective findings in the medical records that the Claims Administrator can use to
make an independent determination as to “the severity of the condition and
diagnosis;” a specific type of MRI; a rupture revealed by the MRI; and “[t]he serious
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determination as to whether the criteria are satisfied and makes, in
the appropriate situation, the ultimate finding of medical
228
After examining the required documents, the
contraindication.
claims administrator may find that “removal of [the] breast implants
is likely, in the exercise of reasonable medical judgment, to result in
significant complications or have a significant adverse effect on [the
229
claimant’s] medical condition.”
3.

Contaminated Blood Litigation

Like the Vioxx and breast implant litigation, the settlement of
Walker v. Bayer Corp. also involved an extrajudicial process that
230
facilitated settlement. This case arose out of the contamination of
America’s blood reserves with human immunodeficiency virus
231
Prior to 1985, approximately sixty-three to eighty-nine
(HIV).
percent of those afflicted with severe hemophilia contracted HIV
232
from transfusions of inadequately screened blood.
The class
included not only those who contracted HIV from infected blood or
substances made from infected blood, but also their partners,
infected children, those who claimed to suffer emotional distress due
to a loved one’s infection, the parents or guardians of minors or
233
incompetents, and representatives of deceased class members.
234
Each individual who was infected by HIV receives $100,000.
The settlement administrator, however, cannot make payment on the
claim until both class counsel and the defendants reach an
235
agreement as to whether the claim should be paid.
If all parties
236
agree, then the claim is paid.
If the parties disallow the claim or
cannot reach an agreement on its merits, then the claim is not paid;
237
this decision, or lack thereof, is appealable to a special master who
238
resolves the claim disputes. If the special master also disallows the

chronic medical condition must be present at the time of the MRI discovery of the
Rupture and at the time [of submission of the r]upture claim.” See id. at 26–27.
228
See id. at 27.
229
CLAIMANT INFORMATION GUIDE, supra note 219, at 27.
230
TIDMARSH, supra note 222, at 95.
231
Id. at 91.
232
Id.
233
Id. at 92.
234
Id. at 93.
235
Id. at 95.
236
TIDMARSH, supra note 222, at 95.
237
Id.
238
Id.
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claim, the claimants are excluded from the class and can sue the
239
defendants individually.
These settlements—of mass tort suits involving pharmaceuticals,
breast implants, and contaminated blood—provide background for
the YouTube litigation and most importantly, the potential resolution
of future copyright infringement claims against YouTube users
through a similar system of private ordering. The relevance of these
settlements is best understood through the lens of the YouTube
240
copyright infringement case.
IV. YOUTUBE AND COPYRIGHT INFRINGEMENT
This section discusses the case Viacom International Inc. v.
YouTube, Inc., in which copyright holders sued YouTube for hosting
copyright-protected content uploaded by end-users on its on its
website. Next, it explores YouTube policies and how the site deals
with the problem of copyrighted content uploaded by third parties
and without permission from rightsholders. Finally, this section
contends that these policies and technologies, while useful in
identifying copyrighted material, do not adequately allow for fair use
of material on the site.
A. Viacom International, Inc. v. YouTube, Inc.
Viacom brought claims of direct, inducement of, contributory,
and vicarious copyright infringement against YouTube for allowing
and facilitating the public display, performance, reproduction, and
241
distribution of its copyrighted material.
YouTube moved for
239

Id.
Viacom Int’l, Inc. v. YouTube, Inc., 718 F. Supp. 2d 514 (S.D.N.Y. 2010).
241
First Amended Complaint, supra note 22, at 25–28. These are the four main
types of copyright claims. Aric S. Jacover & Christopher C. Mackey, Basic Copyright
Enforcement, in UNDERSTANDING COPYRIGHT LAW 2008 133, 142–44 (E. Leonard Rubin
et al. eds., 2008). To win on a direct infringement claim, the plaintiff must prove
that (1) he owns a copyright and (2) one of his rights, protected under the
Copyright Act, has been violated. Id. The remaining three claims involve third
parties. Id. Contributory infringement consists of: “(1) direct infringement by a
primary infringer, (2) knowledge of the infringement, and (3) material contribution
to the infringement.” Id. (citing Ellison v. Robertson, 357 F.3d 1072, 1076 (9th Cir.
2004)). The three elements of vicarious infringement are: “(1) direct infringement
by a primary party, (2) a direct financial benefit to the defendant, and (3) the right
and ability to supervise the infringers.” Id. at 143 (citing A&M Records, Inc. v.
Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004, 1022 (9th Cir. 2001)). Finally, in MGM Studios, Inc. v.
Grokster, Ltd., the Supreme Court held that “one who distributes a device with the
object of promoting its use to infringe copyright, as shown by clear expression or
other affirmative steps taken to foster infringement, is liable for the resulting acts of
240
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summary judgment, claiming that it qualified for the DMCA’s safe
harbor provision contained in 17 U.S.C. § 512(c) and was therefore
242
Viacom made a cross-motion for
not liable for any infringement.
partial summary judgment, claiming that YouTube was not in fact
243
entitled to the safe harbor’s protection.
The court reviewed the
244
safe harbor provision, discussed above.
The key issue in the case was a question of statutory
245
interpretation.
The court had to interpret the phrases “actual
knowledge that the material or an activity using the material on the
system or network is infringing,” and “facts or circumstances from
246
which infringing activity is apparent” in § 512(c)(1)(A)(i) and (ii).
The court had to decide whether knowledge meant “general
awareness that there are infringements,” where the plaintiff asserted
that infringements were prevalent on the site, or whether knowledge
meant “actual or constructive knowledge of specific and identifiable
247
infringements of individual items.”
It looked to the legislative
248
history of the DMCA, citing Senate and House Reports at length.
The statute states that the service provider possesses the requisite
knowledge “by actual knowledge of infringement or . . . awareness of
249
facts or circumstances from which infringing activity is apparent.”
Congress described the red flag test as having subjective and objective
250
components. The first element, which is subjective, deals with the
provider’s subjective awareness of the facts and circumstances
251
surrounding infringement. The second part of the analysis, which
is objective, is to determine “whether infringing activity would have
been apparent to a reasonable person operating under the same or

infringement by third parties.” Id. (quoting MGM Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545
U.S. 913, 939 n.12 (2005)).
242
Viacom Int’l, Inc. v. YouTube, Inc., 718 F. Supp. 2d 514, 516 (S.D.N.Y. 2010).
For a discussion of the safe harbor provision, see supra Part II.C.
243
Id.
244
Id.
245
See id. at 519.
246
Id.
247
Id.
248
YouTube, 718 F. Supp. 2d at 519–24.
249
Id. at 520. The relevant statutory provision, § 512(c)(1)(A)(ii), is a “red flag
test.” Id. A service provider does not have to actively patrol its service for
infringement, but if it has knowledge of infringement, then it will not be eligible for
the safe harbor if it does not act to eliminate or prevent access to the infringing
material. Id. at 520–21.
250
Id. at 520.
251
Id.
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252

similar circumstances.”
In light of the statute itself and the relevant legislative history,
the court concluded that the phrases in question referred to
“knowledge of specific and identifiable infringements of particular
individual items” and that
[m]ere knowledge of prevalence of such activity in general
is not enough. . . . To let knowledge of a generalized practice of
infringement in the industry, or of a proclivity of users to
post infringing materials, impose responsibility on service
providers to discover which of their users’ postings infringe
a copyright would contravene the structure and operation
253
of the DMCA.
254
A
The court reasoned that this was the more practical solution.
service provider is unable to know whether the owner had licensed
the user’s video, whether it was fair use of copyrighted content, or
255
whether the rightsholder contested the use at all.
The court
pointed to the success of the current policy and cited the example of
256
a mass takedown of about 100,000 videos on Viacom’s request.
257
Almost all of the identified videos were removed by the next day.
The court then recounted relevant case law, all of which supported its
258
holding. These cases indicated that the service provider, even when
generally aware of a large amount of infringing activity, is not
required to locate individual instances of infringement and remove
259
the infringing content from its service. The court granted summary
judgment to the defendant rightsholders, holding that they qualified
for the safe harbor’s protection, and denied all of the plaintiffs’ cross
260
motions.
The Second Circuit affirmed the District Court’s
261
construction of the provision, but reversed its grant of summary
262
judgment for the defendants.
252

YouTube, 718 F. Supp. 2d at 520.
Id. at 523 (emphasis added).
254
Id. at 524.
255
Id.
256
Id.
257
Id.
258
See YouTube, 718 F. Supp. 2d at 524–25. For a discussion of the cases that the
court cited, see supra Part II.C.
259
See supra Part II.C.
260
YouTube, 718 F. Supp. 2d at 529.
261
Viacom Int’l, Inc. v. YouTube, Inc., Nos. 10–3270–cv, 10–3342–cv, 2012 WL
1130851, at *7 (2d Cir. Apr. 5, 2012).
262
Id. at *8–9. The court held that there were “triable issue[s] of fact as to
whether YouTube actually knew, or was aware of facts or circumstances that would
253
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B. Current YouTube Policies and Fair Use
YouTube employs two main technologies to indentify
263
copyrighted material: AudioID and VideoID.
Copyright holders
can identify videos that contain all or part of their copyrighted
264
works. Additionally, they can decide what action, if any, should be
265
taken when copyrighted content is identified.
For example, they
can use the videos to generate revenue or to track viewing statistics,
266
In
or they can completely remove these videos from YouTube.
addition to sending YouTube information about the content and
providing YouTube with instructions regarding the copyrighted work,
the rightsholder must send YouTube files of the work to be identified
267
within users’ videos.
These audio or video files serve as reference
material so that YouTube can compare uploaded videos with
268
When copyrighted material is identified,
copyrighted content.
YouTube automatically implements the rightsholder’s desired course
269
of action.
YouTube states that there are numerous benefits of this
270
software. It allows rightsholders to make money, to expand the fan
base of their works, to prevent copyright infringement, to have an
271
automated procedure in place, and to track data on the videos.
272
Currently, over one thousand rightsholders use these technologies.
YouTube states that these technologies allow the fair use of
273
copyrighted content in YouTube videos. Rightsholders are able to
create bright-line rules of their own, including “policies [that]
depend[] on the proportion of a claimed video that contains their
274
work, or the absolute length of the clip used.”
As an example,
YouTube describes a record label that allows users to upload videos
indicate, the existence of particular instances of infringement.” Id.
263
YOUTUBE
AUDIOID
&
YOUTUBE
VIDEOID,
http://www.youtube.com/t/contentid (last visited March 18, 2012).
264
Id.
265
Id.
266
Id.
267
Id.
268
Id.
269
AUDIOID & VIDEOID, supra note 263.
270
Id.
271
Id.
272
Shenaz Zack, Content ID and Fair Use, BROADCASTING OURSELVES ;), THE
OFFICIAL
YOUTUBE
BLOG
(April
22,
2010),
http://youtubeglobal.blogspot.com/2010/04/content-id-and-fair-use.html.
273
Id.
274
Id.
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with song clips of fewer than sixty seconds, but permits YouTube to
275
block videos with more than one minute of a copyrighted song.
Nonetheless, YouTube acknowledges the limitations of this
276
procedure. The company notes that “[r]ights holders are the only
ones in a position to know what is and is not an authorized use of
their content, and [it] require[s] them to enforce their policies in a
277
manner that complies with the law.”
Users can contest removal of a video through an automated
278
process, if they believe the video is a proper use of content.
If a
user receives a notice saying that content has been flagged via
ContentID, then YouTube tells the user which rightsholder contests
279
his use and allows the user to challenge the rightsholder’s claim.
To do so, the user must check a box that reads “This video uses
copyrighted material in a manner that does not require approval of
280
the copyright holder.” After the user objects, YouTube reposts the
281
Then the rightsholder must decide whether he will file a
video.
282
DMCA notification to remove material from YouTube permanently.
These procedures identify copyrighted material well and allow the
rightsholders to dictate YouTube’s course of action. Just because a
user posts copyrighted material does not mean that the post is illegal.
YouTube’s policies may not adequately protect the fair use of
copyrighted content.
The procedure requires a fair use
determination by the rightsholder and an assessment of the video by
the user. While YouTube provides users with information about what
could happen when they use copyrighted material in their videos, it
provides scant information about what constitutes fair use. The
company tells users that in order to determine whether their videos
are infringing upon copyrighted material, the users “need to analyze
and weigh four factors that are outlined in the U.S. copyright
283
statute.” This seems to be of little use to those outside of the legal
profession. As YouTube acknowledges, “the weighing of these four
275

Id.
Id.
277
Id.
278
Zack, supra note 272.
279
Id.
280
Id.
281
Id.
282
Id.
283
General Copyright Inquiries: Using Some Copyrighted Content in Your Videos,
YOUTUBE HELP ARTICLES, http://www.google.com/support/youtube/bin/answer.py
?hl=en&answer=143457 (last visited Feb. 11, 2012).
276
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factors is often quite subjective and complex. For this reason, it’s
284
often difficult to determine whether a particular use is a ‘fair use.’”
Understandably, YouTube will not assess a user’s video to determine
whether it is protected under the fair use exception, but instead
suggests the user consult an attorney for assistance, and refers the
285
user to various other informational websites.
Thus, Audio ID and Video ID have their limits, as they are
technologies that can identify the underlying copyrighted work, but
do not assess the work as a whole to decide whether it falls into the
286
fair use exception.
Two particular incidents illustrate this
shortcoming. During the 2008 presidential campaign, John McCain’s
campaign requested that YouTube review the McCain team’s posted
videos prior to responding to DMCA takedown notices and removing
287
them from the website. According to Trevor Potter, the campaign’s
general counsel, many of the removed McCain advertisements
constituted fair use of portions of television footage and were thus
288
non-infringing material.
YouTube’s general counsel, Zahava
289
Levine, firmly denied the request. She said, “[l]awyers and judges
constantly disagree about what does and does not constitute fairuse . . . [and n]o number of lawyers could possibly determine with a
reasonable level of certainty whether all the videos for which we
290
receive disputed takedown notices qualify as fair-use.” Levine stated
that the company did not want to risk losing the DMCA safe harbor’s
protection by failing to quickly remove the videos when a takedown
291
request was received.
She also stated that rightsholders, not
YouTube, should bear the burden of deciding whether their video is
protected by fair use because the determination is difficult and the
292
rightsholders are better able to make such a determination.
She
noted that the rightsholder and the user “hold all of the relevant
information [as to whether the video is infringing], including the
284

Id.
Id.
286
Fred von Lohmann, YouTube’s Content ID (C)ensorship Problem Illustrated,
DEEPLINKS BLOG (Mar. 2, 2010), http://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2010/03/youtubescontent-id-c-ensorship-problem.
287
Sarah Lai Stirland, YouTube to McCain: You Made Your DMCA Bed, Lie in It,
THREAT LEVEL: PRIVACY, CRIME, AND SECURITY ONLINE (Oct. 15, 2008, 10:25AM),
http://www.wired.com/threatlevel/2008/10/youtube-to-mcca/.
288
Id.
289
Id.
290
Id.
291
Id.
292
Id.
285
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source of any content used, the ownership rights to the content, and
293
If
any licensing arrangements in place between the parties.”
rightsholders do in fact think that their videos are permissible use,
then they can issue a DMCA counter-notice and YouTube will re-post
294
the videos.
Additionally, during December 2008 and January 2009, Warner
Music Group sent a massive takedown notice affecting thousands of
295
videos. Some, like the Electronic Frontier Foundation, called this a
“fair use massacre,” as implicated videos included those using Warner
Music’s songs as background tracks and musicians covering a
296
copyrighted song while playing along with the original track. This
en masse takedown was possible because of the ease and speed of the
297
Content ID automated process.
John McCain’s well-funded and influential campaign created
videos, uploaded them to YouTube, and yet still had problems with
the current notice-and-takedown process because the process
requires videos that may constitute fair use to be removed. This
outcome does not bode well for the average YouTube user, who may
not be legally savvy and cannot determine whether his video is a
candidate for a fair use defense. Users may fear legal repercussions if
they file an objection and the rightsholder contests the objection and
sues. Thus, users may avoid filing an objection, even when there is a
high probability that their video is permissible under the fair use
exception.
V. TOWARDS A VIDEO AND MUSIC RIGHTS REGISTRY THROUGH
SETTLEMENT: COULD THE BOOK RIGHTS REGISTRY BE A MODEL?
A. Progress is Deadlocked
It is safe to assume that a massive copyright law reform will not
occur in the near future. As mentioned above, the odds of reform
taking place in the next decade are slim due to more pressing
national concerns, like global conflict, climate change, and other

293

Stirland, supra note 287.
Id.
295
Tarleton Gillespie, The Politics of “Platforms,” 12 NEW MEDIA & SOC’Y 3, 13
(2010).
296
Fred von Lohmann, YouTube’s January Fair Use Massacre, DEEPLINKS BLOG (Feb.
3,
2009),
http://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2009/01/youtubes-january-fair-usemassacre.
297
Id.
294
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more urgent reforms of tax and immigration law. Moreover, there
is disagreement as to whether Congress should rewrite the copyright
law or whether judicial action, like the Google Books Settlement, is
the proper method of change. For example, Professor Stephen
Jamar explains the three ways in which user-generated content could
be protected, but he is pessimistic about the success of these
299
methods.
First, the current regime requires rightsholder
permission for use of copyrighted work; rightsholders can simply
300
deny this permission.” Jamar states that this is not ideal because the
rightsholders may prevent their work from being used in any way and
301
thereby effectively chill speech. Second, the courts can create a per
se rule that “noncompeting, noncommercial, user-generated content
distributed online” is fair use, while drawing on other principles—
like the fact that copyright protection does not extend to general
storylines and characters—to encourage the growth of user-generated
302
content.
This development would be slow and inconsistent across
303
Third, Congress could legislate to increase the user’s
the circuits.
304
rights. Jamar notes that the wealthiest and therefore most powerful
interests desire longer copyright terms, increased protection, and
305
306
greater enforcement. These interests have historically prevailed.
B. Potential Solutions that Work Within the System Have Limitations
Potential solutions attempt to work within the existing system;
there are, however, significant drawbacks. For example, Rumblefish,
a music licensing company, is selling licenses to copyrighted songs,
307
enabling users to receive and edit an entire track of a song.
The
308
While
song, however, may only be used for personal videos.
purchasing a license ensures that the user is not infringing a
copyright, as he now has express permission to use the material, there

298

Samuelson, supra note 135, at 556; see supra Part II.D.
Steven D. Jamar, Crafting Copyright Law to Encourage and Protect User-Generated
Content in the Internet Social Networking Context, 19 WIDENER L.J. 843, 871 (2010).
300
Id.
301
Id.
302
Id.
303
Id.
304
Id. at 872.
305
Jamar, supra note 299, at 872.
306
Id.
307
Joseph Plambeck, For $1.99, a (Legal) Song To Add to YouTube Videos, N.Y. TIMES,
June 28, 2010, at B6.
308
Id.
299
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could be instances where a license is not needed because the video
falls within the fair use exception.
Additionally, it is possible that in the future, YouTube may make
agreements with movie studios to show copyrighted content online.
For example, Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer posted full-length television
309
episodes and movies, while video pages display advertisements.
Although the content offered is limited, it could mark a shift in
310
Analysts have
relationships between YouTube and Hollywood.
stated that this may signal a period of collaboration between the site
311
and rightsholders.
Nevertheless, studios still prefer Hulu—a
website that was actually created by movie and television studios—and
312
conclude that YouTube’s site layout is “too cluttered.” Additionally,
YouTube was unable to come to an agreement with Warner, under
which the studios would have received advertising revenue and
313
YouTube would post some of the studio’s videos.
Thus, while
Hollywood shows signs of cooperating with the site, the user who
wants to use some part of copyrighted work in his own video has little
guidance on how to do so without running afoul of copyright law.
Deals like this would improve the public’s ability to view the content
online, but not its ability to manipulate the video.
Finally,
advertisement revenue sharing allows rightsholders to profit from
their content while not directly addressing the problem of potential
314
infringement.
YouTube emphasizes the distinct appeal of
315
advertising in this context because it is personalized to the user.
For example, instead of removing a video of a copyrighted song,
YouTube runs advertisements on the page and prompts the viewer to
316
purchase the song or ringtone..
The revenue generated from the
317
sale of these advertisements would be shared with the rightsholders.
Thus, while copyright law is stuck in developmental limbo,
technology will continue to advance and the problems facing
309

Brad Stone & Brooks Barnes, MGM to Post Full Films On YouTube, N.Y. TIMES,
Nov. 9, 2008, http://www.nytimes.com/2008/11/10/business/media/10mgm.html?
_r=1&adxnnl=1&ref=technology&adxnnlx=1328988115-julDs/TSo3TMHdH+AtZ0cg.
310
Id.
311
Id.
312
Id.
313
Tim Arango, As Rights Clash on YouTube, Some Music Vanishes, N.Y. TIMES, Mar.
22, 2009, http://www.nytimes.com/2009/03/23/business/media/23warner.html.
314
See Claire Cain Miller, YouTube Ads Turn Videos Into Revenue, N.Y. TIMES, Sept.
3, 2010, at B1.
315
Id.
316
Id.
317
Id.
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rightsholders and users will grow exponentially more complex. As a
practical matter, this deadlock must be resolved. Here, as in the
YouTube case, the service provider is protected by the DMCA, absent
318
any actual knowledge of specific infringing content.
Additionally,
the court notes that YouTube’s Content ID systems are effective in
319
identifying and then potentially removing infringing content;
however, this system does not truly leave room for fair use of
copyrighted content. In Viacom v. YouTube, the Second Circuit
emphasized that Congress placed the burden on the rightsholder to
320
determine whether material was infringing. When choosing among
the rightsholder, the user, and the service provider to decide who
should make this fair use determination, it makes sense to place the
burden on the rightsholder, who possesses the most information
about the content.
In the YouTube context, however, this can be a problematic
approach. First, this process gives the rightsholders a large amount
of power to make their own determinations. While rightsholders
ideally make these determinations, there is no check by a third party.
Essentially, the rightsholders seem to be able to make their own rules.
Second, YouTube’s approach creates inconsistencies. For example,
one record label may decide to send a takedown notice to users
whose videos contain more than ten seconds of a copyrighted song,
while another could have YouTube issue takedown notices to users
using more than sixty seconds of protected content. Therefore, the
users are unable to predict what may be taken down, what is
permissible, and cannot necessarily expect YouTube to treat the same
length or type of content consistently.
C. Towards a Music and Video Rights Registry?
If the parties engage in future litigation, a settlement of that
litigation could stipulate to a Music and Video Rights Registry
(MVRR) that determines “fair use” solely in the YouTube context.
Clearly, because an independent registry would have no law-making
power, the determinations made by the committee would not be
binding in any other context. The MVRR, however, could provide
guidelines for users to establish some norms and expectations for
both the users and the rightsholders. The MVRR’s determinations
318

Viacom Int’l, Inc. v. YouTube, Inc., 718 F. Supp. 2d 514, 523 (S.D.N.Y. 2010);
see supra Part IV.A.
319
YouTube, 718 F. Supp. 2d at 524.
320
Id. at 523.
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would be influenced by case law but adapted for use on the site. This
provides consistent standards and removes the initial fair use
determination from the hands of the rightsholders. Moreover, like
the Google Books Rights Registry, the MVRR would seat a board of
directors comprised of rightsholders in the music, television, and
movie industries. Inclusion of artists, however, would be important as
well. While determinations of brightline rules would certainly
provoke disagreements, the goal would simply be to set ground rules
in this one discrete context with potential for compromise. For
example, parties might stipulate that up to sixty seconds of
copyrighted material is permissible. Any use of more than sixty
seconds may be flagged for review by the MVRR, if the user believes
his video is still permissible fair use.
YouTube’s process would remain similar to the current
procedures, but the MVRR would play an active role. Audio ID and
Video ID would still be used and would still be vital to the process
because they would initially identify the copyrighted content.
Rightsholders would still have the option of establishing certain
procedures that YouTube would have to follow if videos using
copyrighted content were flagged. Examples of such procedures
include leaving the videos online, tracking how many times the video
is viewed, or using the videos to earn revenue through advertising.
Rightsholders could not create their own bright-line rules requiring
YouTube to send takedown notices to users of copyrighted content—
for example, rightsholders could not require YouTube to send
takedown notices to users whose video includes thirty seconds or
more of a protected song; videos would not be automatically
removed. YouTube would notify individuals that their videos were
potentially infringing a copyright and, instead of going to court, users
would submit their video to the MVRR for review. This would allow
users who believed they had a legitimate fair use defense to avoid the
risk of being sued by a rightsholder. These rightsholders most likely
have greater financial resources and time to pursue claims than the
average user. Thus, submission to the MVRR would not expose the
user to suit and would not deter claims of legitimate fair use.
The second major function of the MVRR would be to facilitate
the sale of licenses for music and video use. If the MVRR determines
that the content does violate copyright law, then the MVRR would
give the user an option to purchase a license from the rightsholder to
allow the user to keep the content on the site and to use the
copyrighted material. The license could be a flat fee for use of any
portion of a song, or the MVRR could charge a fee based on the
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portion of the song used. Finally, if the user refuses to purchase a
license, then the video would be taken down.
Major obstacles to the workability of this project are evident.
The primary concern would be financing the MVRR’s operations.
The Google Book Rights Registry would be funded by Google’s initial
321
322
contribution and then sustained by the revenue Google receives.
Although a part of the giant Google corporation, YouTube itself has
323
not been profitable. This year, however, it is projected to earn $1.7
324
billion dollars. While the MVRR might not be plausible currently, if
YouTube revenues continue to increase, then YouTube may be able
to make an initial contribution to establish the MVRR and sustain it.
If YouTube can sell advertising on the site that is displayed with the
copyrighted material, then the proceeds could be used to fund the
MVRR. Another major concern is the unmanageable nature of the
MVRR’s task, as the sheer number of videos posted on the site is
massive. A great amount of manpower would be required to view
content and make determinations. After some specific rules were
decided upon by the board of directors, however, the determinations
of fair use might be easier, because fewer videos would have to be
reviewed.
The logistical obstacles to establishing the MVRR are great, but
still not as problematic as those that are preventing copyright reform.
Although idealistic and aspirational, the existence of a body like the
MVRR may be more plausible than actual changes in the copyright
law. Creating the parameters for use of copyrighted content on
YouTube may influence the public’s understanding and use of
copyrighted content. This may even develop a greater consensus in
the public opinion about what is and is not permissible use.
Establishing a working definition of fair use may even be the impetus
for legal reform.

321
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VI. CONCLUSION
The Google Books project digitized the massive libraries of many
research universities. Google scanned these books without the
publishers’ or authors’ consent and posted snippets of these books
on the Internet, returning them as search results of Google queries.
In the wake of the unilateral scanning, rightsholders brought suit
against Google for copyright infringement in the Southern District of
New York. The court did not decide the merits of the case, as the
parties reached a settlement that, although rejected by the court in
total, has a meritorious provision. As part of the agreement, Google
was to create a Book Rights Registry to act as an intermediary
between rightsholders and Google itself. The Registry would have
facilitated copyright claims and administer payment to the
rightholders.
In a related copyright matter, Viacom sued YouTube for
permitting infringing content on its website. Viacom complained
that users uploaded copyrighted videos, allowing the public to view
them without the rightsholders’ consent, in violation of copyright
law. The Southern District of New York held that YouTube was
protected under the notice and take-down statutory safe harbor,
which grants protection from liability if an Internet intermediary has
procedures in place by which it effectively removes infringing content
at a rightsholder’s request. Fair use complicates the matter.
Copyrighted material can be used in specific circumstances that are
enumerated by the Copyright Act. In its mechanistic take-down of
copyrighted content, no fair use determination is made.
In light of the current state of copyright law, including the fair
use exception and the DMCA, a provision of the Google Books
Settlement may provide a solution to the clash between the law and
the digital world. It may serve as a useful model for the future
resolution of copyright infringement in the YouTube context,
especially in light of prior mass tort settlements. YouTube’s current
methods regarding copyrighted work do not adequately address the
question of fair use. To address this problem, an analog to the Book
Rights Registry, created by settlement of potential future litigation,
may be able to set basic principles for what is an acceptable use of
copyrighted content on the site. While not truly resolving the legal
definition of fair use and facing great logistical difficulties, a MVRR
would standardize the rules in this context, providing guidance to
users and rightsholders without stifling legitimate expression.

